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What Are Over-the-Road Truckers Paid For? 
Evidence from an Exogenous Regulatory Change on the Role of 
Social Comparisons and Work Organization in Wage Determination 
 
Using evidence from recent work on truckers and disaggregated older data prior researchers 
did not have, we revisit a classic topic and find some new answers. We focus on differentials 
in average annual earnings at the firm level among mileage-paid over-the-road tractor-trailer 
drivers (“road drivers”) employed by US for-hire trucking companies, before and after 
economic deregulation. Road driver output is individualized, and pay is on the basis of a 
piece rate (mileage). However, road drivers work under two distinct logistical systems – less-
than-truckload [LTL], and truckload [TL] – associated with two different forms of work 
organization. We find that – contrary to the predictions of Rose (1987) – not only are road 
drivers for LTL companies paid more than those for TL companies, but in LTL the union 
earnings premium was maintained following deregulation and union coverage fell slowly, 
while in TL both the union differential and union coverage fell sharply. We review relevant 
theoretical explanations: payment for cognitive abilities or non-pecuniary disamenities; 
standard efficiency wage models based on independent utilities; sharing of product market 
rents; equity concerns resulting from social comparisons between employee groups; and 
differences in work organization as a source of union rents or quasi-rents. Only equity 
concerns, for the LTL earnings differential, and quasi rents (but not a union threat effect, 
contrary to Henrickson and Wilson (2008)), for union coverage and premium in LTL, are 
consistent with our empirical results. Both earnings differentials are based on differences in 
work organization, rather than differences in the workers or the work itself. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J31, J42, L92 
  
Keywords:  fair wage, equity, compensating differential, cognitive ability, quasi-rent, 
rent-sharing, work organization, trucking, trucker, less-than-truckload (LTL), 





Stephen V. Burks 
Division of Social Science 
University of Minnesota Morris 
600 East 4th Street 
Morris, Minnesota 56267 
USA 
E-mail: svburks@morris.umn.edu   
 




In this paper we study the annual earnings of truck drivers who drive truck tractors pulling 
long semi-trailers—the “tractor-trailer” or "18-wheeler”—over medium to long distances in the 
continental US, and who are paid on the basis of mileage. We use earnings differences within 
this apparently homogeneous group of employees (known as “road drivers”) to shed some light 
on theories of wage determination.  
Our data come from reports filed by US trucking companies with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) between 1977 and 1986. This period begins with the final two years of the 
federal regulatory regime, dating from 1935. Under this regime, entry to inter-city trucking was 
restricted: firms were granted the authority to haul particular commodities over particular inter-
city routes, and the prices charged for freight services were controlled by “rate bureaus,” which 
were essentially legally sanctioned cartels (Rothenberg 1994). The years immediately following 
deregulation (1979-86) are unique in that they saw the combination of intense competition with 
the continuation of a high level of compliance with the ICC’s extensive public reporting 
requirements—hence our data, which is drawn from the ICC’s “Form M” (for “motor carrier”). 
One feature of this data, unexploited in previous studies of driver pay, is that it reports the 
proportion of the company’s shipments which are smaller, less-than-truckload (LTL) ones, as 
opposed to larger ones making up a full truckload (TL); differences on this dimension are 
associated with different internal firm logistics. A second feature of our data is that we have 
access to a breakout of earnings by employee type during this time period, unlike other 
investigators who have used similar information, and so are able to separate road drivers from 
others.  We use these data to examine how the differences in the work organization of the 
relevant firms affect earnings.  
Companies which haul a high proportion of LTL shipments (high LTL) tend to have a 
distinctly different pattern of work organization from those that are TL specialists because of the 
different logistical systems used. A high LTL carrier will operate a network of freight re-
handling terminals; at each terminal small shipments picked up from customers within a certain 
geographical area are aggregated into full truckloads.  These truckloads are then moved (by the 
                                                 
1We are grateful to seminar participants at Luiss University (Rome), Daniele Nosenzo, Mitch 
Hoffman, Eric Beshers, and Kristen Monaco for helpful comments, and Burks gratefully 
acknowledges the assistance of Tom Corsi and Ed Welkener in the original acquisition of 
different parts of the data utilized.  
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road drivers we study here) to other terminals of the same company, where they are broken down 
for delivery to customers in the areas served by the receiving terminals. 
LTL specialists also employ local pickup-and-delivery drivers, who work in the vicinity of a 
particular terminal, and who generally drive smaller trucks; some have specialized dock workers. 
These employee groups (who are normally paid by the hour, instead of by the mile) are not our 
direct focus, but they turn out to play a central role in the organizational story developed below. 
TL specialists, by contrast, have a simpler form of work organization: their primary business 
consists of hauling truckload-sized shipments between points for various customers. This is what 
almost all of their drivers, studied here, do on the job. Most TL specialists also haul some smaller 
(LTL) shipments, but do so to a limited extent as they do not have the benefit (nor the expense) 
of a network of terminals.
2 These organizational differences reflect the fact that it is not cost-
minimizing to move high capacity vehicles over long distances partially loaded: LTL specialist 
firms have freight-handling terminals to make up (and break down) full loads, but firms which 
haul primarily TL shipments—which come as full loads—do not.   
Most aspects of the jobs done by road drivers in TL and LTL firms are identical: tasks, skills 
required, licensing, insurability, monitoring, and the form of compensation. Yet there are 
significant differences in the pay of road drivers working for companies which are TL specialists 
and companies which are LTL specialists. Our aim here is to use what we know of the 
differences in work organization, together with data on the evolution of these pay differentials 
over the divide between regulated and deregulated eras, to shed some light on different theories 
of wage determination.  
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews institutional changes in 
the trucking industry in the period studied, and the effect this had on work organization. Section 
3 discusses theories of wage determination as they apply to the companies and drivers studied 
here.  Section 4 presents the data. Regression specifications are discussed, and regression results 
presented, in Section 5. Section 6 concludes by discussing the implications of our findings. 
 
                                                 
2 For instance, a TL specialist firm might accept a load with one or two small shipment drop-offs 
en route to the final destination, which could delivered by a single road driver.  However, 
relatively few LTL shipments come with such pre-arranged “delivery density.”  Competing for 
more general LTL business between these points would require terminals near each city.  
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2.  Work organization, market structure and regulation in the US trucking industry 
We described above the two basic technologies, or overall ways of organizing production, in 
the long distance transportation of general commodities, truckload (TL), and less than truckload 
(LTL).
3 In the US trucking market today, most companies specialize in either TL or LTL (Burks, 
Belzer et al. 2010). However, this differs from the situation that prevailed when market entry and 
prices in for-hire trucking were regulated, as they were from 1935 until 1980. Under the Motor 
Carrier Act of 1935, market entry was sharply restricted, and rates were set by “rate bureaus” 
which were effectively state-sanctioned cartels (Moore 1978; Judiciary Committee 1980; 
Rothenberg 1994). 
Market entry restrictions also shaped the organization of production within trucking firms.  
Because entry into most markets which already had incumbents was effectively blocked by ICC 
policies, the primary way firms could expand was by buying an authority from an existing firm; 
these in turn became scarce assets.  Details are beyond the scope of this paper, and we will 
simply note that ICC policies made it far more difficult for TL specialists to expand by 
combining authorities than for LTL specialists (Rothenberg 1994). As a result, a much larger 
amount of full truckload freight was hauled by carriers that used the LTL-type organization of 
production, with local freight-handling terminals and fixed inter-terminal routes, than would 
have been optimal in the absence of these constraints.  
When deregulation removed barriers to entry and route adjustments, and made individual 
pricing possible, the industry underwent a sharp restructuring (Perry 1986; Campbell 1987; 
Glaskowski 1990; Corsi and Stowers 1991; Burks 1999). Incumbent TL-type firms expanded, 
and thousands of new small TL firms entered. Without the overhead costs of a terminal system, 
and paying lower wages, these firms sharply cut the cost of TL transportation. Increased 
competition and lower costs were reflected in freight rates: Moore (1983) finds that TL rates fell 
25%, LTL rates 11%, in real terms during only the first three years of deregulation. The average 
value of operating authorities traded fell correspondingly, from over a half million dollars each 
to the few thousands it now took to acquire one from scratch (Moore 1986). 
The new TL segment took most of the truckload freight that firms using LTL type production 
had been hauling, and then began taking market share from both railroads and private carriage 
                                                 
3 This omits the intercity parcel segment (e.g. UPS or FedEx Ground). See Burks, et al. (2010).   
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(Campbell 1987).
4 There was very little de novo entry into LTL, and that which occurred was at 
small geographic scope, but existing firms scrambled to rationalize and expand route structures 
(Moore 1986; Perry 1986), while coping with the loss of TL freight, and many incumbents 
failed. The result was a transformation of the technology mix, with the emergence of the focused 
specialization of individual carriers into TL and LTL types which is reflected in the way the 
North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) categorizes trucking firms today 
(Burks, Monaco et al. 2004b; Burks, Belzer et al. 2010). 
The market structures of the two segments that resulted from this transformation are quite 
different.  Because of the lack of entry barriers, the TL segment is effectively perfectly 
competitive; a firm with a single truck can compete, on a trip-by-trip basis with the largest TL 
carrier.  Returns to scale are essentially constant (Grimm, Corsi et al. 1989), and size provides 
few non-cost advantages. While a large TL firm can provide coordination among multiple trips 
that a small one cannot, this function is also available through the market from third party 
logistics (3PL) firms, who subcontract individual trips to small fleets (Burks, Belzer et al. 2010).  
According to the 1997 quinquennial Economic Census, the first to directly categorize firms into 
these two segments, the long distance general freight TL segment contained 20,061 firms, more 
than half of which had 9 or fewer employees. The most telling fact is that the biggest firms had a 
very modest share of the market: the 4-firm and 8-firm concentrations ratios were, respectively, 
11.4% and 15.9% (US Census Bureau 1997a).  
By contrast, there are entry barriers to the LTL segment. Substantial sunk costs are required 
to establish sufficient shipment flow density over new links in the terminal network to make 
average shipment costs competitive (which is why there was little de novo entry in LTL after 
deregulation). In 1997 there were 2,413 firms in this segment, or one-tenth as many in TL. Only 
60 LTL firms had 10 or more establishments in 1997. Since an inter-city LTL firm with a small 
to medium terminal network can serve only the specific geographic region defined by the 
network, for the most part it competes directly only with other firms serving the same region 
(Corsi, Grimm et al. 1992; Burks, Belzer et al. 2010). Thus, 1997 national 4-firm and 8-firm 
concentration ratios in LTL that were qualitatively higher than those for TL, at 39.3% and 
                                                 
4 Private carriage is the transportation of freight that is owned by the firm doing the hauling, e.g. 
when a truck owed by Wal-Mart hauls goods from a Wal-Mart warehouse to a Wal-Mart store.  
Private carriers produce about half of U.S. trucking services (Burks, Monaco et al. 2004a).  
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57.9%, respectively (US Census Bureau 1997b), actually understate the effective concentration 
of the LTL segment. The highly competitive structure of the TL market appears to offer little 
scope for product market rents, while the more concentrated structure and higher sunk costs of 
entry could theoretically produce such rents in LTL. However, the only direct test of market 
power found no evidence that LTL firms have any (Nebesky, McMullen et al. 1995), suggesting 
that if such rents exist, they can't be very large. In the absence of market power, the sunk cost in 
organization and facilities represented by the terminal network, and the near absence of de novo 
entry, suggest Marshallian quasi-rents, a point we will return to below in Section 3.3.2. 
 
3.  Driving work and theories of wage determination 
How can we explain differences in mileage pay rates, leading to differences in earnings, 
between the TL and LTL road drivers? The available answers fall into five classes: a) 
compensating differentials, due to differences in non-pecuniary amenities and disamenities; b) 
differences in the intensity of job demands, providing a return to worker quality in the form of 
cognitive ability; c) different reference points for what is perceived as a fair wage; d) differences 
in the structural affinity for unionization, which could affect the ability of the union to enforce 
rent- or quasi-rent sharing; or differences in the sharing of product-market rents with employees 
more generally.  
 
3.1.  Compensating Differentials 
Most road drivers face significant non-pecuniary disamenities on the job. The typical weekly 
hours are long: as are all other workers engaged in interstate transportation, road drivers are 
exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act and do not earn overtime rates, the Hours of Service 
regulations permit up to 60 hours per seven-day week (Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration 2011), and the piece rate pay system incentivizes high miles and hence long 
hours. In addition, the time of day each tour of duty begins can vary over the work week, 
depending on the needs of shippers and receivers; since road drivers travel relatively long 
distances, they are often uncertain about when they will return home, and often spend 
significantly less time at home than workers in other blue collar jobs (Belzer 1995; Burks, Belzer 
et al. 2010).   
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Viewed across TL versus LTL specialist firms, these disamenities are far greater in the TL 
segment (Burks, Belzer et al. 2010).   This is due to differences between the logistical systems of 
the two types of operation. LTL road drivers move primarily between the firm's own terminals; 
this makes the number of origins and destinations limited, reducing the uncertainty about routes 
and work weeks and permitting drivers more and more regular time at home. Further, TL road 
drivers frequently have to supervise loading or unloading to verify that door seals are unbroken 
or that piece counts are correct, and for freight that can be handled, when customers require it 
they must physically load or unload the freight on their trailers; these activities are much rarer for 
LTL road drivers, since origins and terminations of their runs are at the firm's own terminals, at 
which local employees do most freight handling work. The differential rates of turnover in TL 
and LTL firms (see section 3.3, below), are strong evidence in this regard.  Thus, if there are 
compensating differentials they should increase earnings in TL firms.  
 
3.2.  Cognitive ability 
There is good reason to believe that the typical TL job is more cognitively demanding than 
the typical LTL one. Because LTL drivers move primarily between their firm's own terminals, 
they face a restricted set of origins, destinations, and routes. But TL drivers serve a much more 
varied set of shipper and receiver locations, spread as far as all the way across the 48 states of the 
continental US. For each load they must select and travel over routes hundreds or thousands of 
miles long subject to potentially conflicting constraints that include shipper and consignee day 
and time requirements at the endpoints, a limited set of available fuel stops, possible restrictions 
on toll road use, weight limits and overhead height limits that block particular bridges or 
highway segments, congestion and weather conditions which can change over the course of a trip 
(the latter especially important during winter), and daily and weekly limitations on driving and 
total work hours from the Hours of Service regulations.  The sequential nature of trips means that 
small errors or delays early in a dispatch sequence can strongly affect total miles per week, as the 
loads available for later trip segments may depend on the timeliness with which earlier ones are 
completed. With pay based on a predetermined road distance between points the driver’s 
effective hourly wage depends on solving this ongoing two-to-three day planning puzzle well.
5 
                                                 
5 For a successful versus an unsuccessful TL driver see Di Salvatore’s (1988) description.  
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 Burks et al. (2009) study 1,065 new TL road drivers during their initial training, in a context 
in which completion of a year of employment after training cancels the several-thousand-dollar 
training debt. They find that among all the ex ante characteristics they measured, the strongest 
predictors of completing the debt-cancellation period are measures of cognitive ability 
(nonverbal IQ, numeracy, and a planning ability measure, with the last of these being the most 
predictive).  The differences are large: the retention of the top quintile by nonverbal IQ was 
twice that of the lowest quintile. Since it is unlikely that lower IQ is correlated with better 
fallback options, this suggests that variations in cognitive skills within the population of 
prospective drivers are an important determinant of successful matching with a TL job (Burks 
2009). This may also be true for LTL road drivers, but for the reasons discussed above the effect 
should be stronger in TL; if there is a premium paid for scarce cognitive skills it should raise 
earnings in of TL drivers relative to LTL drivers. 
 
3.3.  Rents and rent sharing 
Differentials may also be the consequence of drivers’ sharing product market rents captured 
by their employers, or through cost-minimizing rents in the form of efficiency wages; we 
consider both below. But first we note that rents, from whatever source, imply job queues (Katz 
and Summers 1989; Holzer, Katz et al. 1991; Dickens and Lang 1993).  The TL segment, in the 
fully competitive form that emerged in the 1980's, not only has no queues, but has driver 
turnover rates that are extremely high during non-recession periods. The emergence of a “driver 
shortage” was widely noted in the trade press soon after the economy recovered from the 1981-
82 recession (Lemay and Taylor 1988; Southern, Rakowski et al. 1989; Glaskowski 1990). The 
American Trucking Associations began surveying its member firms quarterly in the late 1990's, 
and during periods of economic growth mean turnover rates for large TL carriers have 
persistently been on the order of 100%-140%, with LTL firms having rates on the order of 5% - 
20% (Economic and Statistics Group 2007; Watson 2009; Burks, Belzer et al. 2010). That is, TL 
firms have annualized turnover rates two to three times the 35% that is typical for transportation 
and warehousing as a whole (SHRM 2008), while LTL firms have half this rate. Thus, we can 
rule out any significant labor rents at the margin in the TL segment following deregulation.    
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3.3.1.  Efficiency wages, fair wage reference points and internal equity 
When information about effort is asymmetric, and the employer's measures of both output 
and effort are noisy or costly, the employer may not be able to directly contract for either effort 
or output. This leads to efficiency wages, in which is profit maximizing for the employer to pay 
more than the employee’s next best option in order to incentivize effort.  
 However, road driving work provides individualized outputs that are measurable.  Despite 
the sometimes hard-to-monitor inputs (the sequence of judgments to be made and effort at 
multiple tasks; see section 3.2), at the end of the run one driver has moved a rig over the road 
from point A to point B safely and on time (or not). For this reason it is possible to pay road 
drivers on piece rate—by the mile, for the standard number of miles attached to each specific trip 
segment—and in so doing align driver incentives with firm objectives, to a good first 
approximation.
6 Thus, in a world of independent utility functions, there is little scope for 
efficiency wages in road driving; this applies both to standard labor discipline models (Shapiro 
and Stiglitz 1984; Bowles 1985; Gintis and Ishikawa 1987), and to simple reciprocity or "gift-
exchange" models (Akerlof 1982; Fehr, Kirchsteiger et al. 1993).  
However, the possibility remains that workers may withhold effort if they do not perceive 
their wage to be fair by comparison with relevant reference workers (Frank 1985; Akerlof and 
Yellen 1990; Fehr, Gachter et al. 1997; Fehr, Götte et al. 2009; Gächter and Thöni 2010). The 
literature suggests that the most relevant reference groups are composed of co-workers within the 
same firm, especially when those making the comparisons have some knowledge of their co-
workers’ circumstances and pay (Bewley 1999; Falk and Knell 2004; Clark and Senik 2006). 
Fairness generally requires similar pay for similar workers doing similar work, but pay 
differences may be seen as justified when they reflect differences in circumstances or merit 
(Adams 1966; Konow 2003). How might this be relevant to difference in road driver pay 
between TL and LTL firms? 
Except for driver teams (which generally receive similar pay rates unless one driver is a 
trainee) road drivers work alone. TL drivers have less contact with other employees than do LTL 
                                                 
6 Thus, mileage pay is more correctly called "pay per trip." Most firms also provide secondary 
incentives for fuel economy or safe driving, but these are small in comparison to the base rate, 
and often take the form of an ex post addition to the mileage rate, not a lump sum.   
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drivers.  Due to the differences in route variety and length described above (section 3.2), even 
though they have a specific home terminal, TL drivers start from that point and return to it only 
when they are due time off, which could be every few days but more commonly would be every 
two to three weeks. They have little or no regular workplace interaction with anyone at their 
home terminal other than their dispatchers and/or supervisors, and sometimes with the mechanics 
who repair their tractors.  Thus, there is little scope for relevant pay comparisons. 
In LTL firms, however, the firms’ terminals host stable work groups of city pickup and 
delivery (P&D) drivers, and in fact such drivers are usually larger in number than road drivers. 
P&D drivers might naturally form part of the road drivers’ reference group.  P&D drivers are not 
on piece rates, but are generally paid by the hour, and at an hourly rate that generates earnings 
above those of the typical blue collar worker, and job queues (Burks 1998; Burks 1999).  The 
outputs of P&D drivers, who handle many distinct small shipments during each shift, are not 
transparent in the same way the outputs of road drivers are, and given their relatively high 
earnings, this suggests that efficiency wages may be in play.
7 However, for present purposes 
what matters is not why P&D drivers have high earnings, but rather that they have high earnings 
and also form a relevant reference group for road drivers in the same firm. If social comparisons 
were irrelevant and there were any reason to pay P&D drivers more, LTL firms could just use a 
two-tier system and pay road drivers less.  But if social comparisons are relevant, since road 
drivers historically have a higher status position than P&D drivers (they operate the largest 
tractor-trailers an LTL firm has, and do less handling of freight (Levinson 1980; Perry 1986)), 
this may be precluded (Akerlof and Yellen 1990; Fehr and Kirchsteiger 1994; Gächter and Thöni 
2010).  Thus, if equity rents are involved in road driver pay, they should be higher in LTL firms.  
 
3.3.2.  Product market rents, quasi-rents and the union premium 
Rent sharing is the appropriation, by employees, of some portion of a firm’s rents or quasi-
rents. Rent-sharing is assumed to occur because employees have some measure of bargaining 
power. Between 1935 and 1980 the regulatory system created rents at the industry level, and 
rent-sharing also operated at that level: the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) came 
to represent most of the drivers in for-hire trucking; wages were determined through industry-
wide wage agreements (the National Master Freight Agreement, or NMFA, plus various 
                                                 
7 An argument to this effect is offered by Burks (1999).  
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supplementary agreements for specialized areas of trucking (Levinson 1980; Perry 1986; Belzer 
1994)). There is no reason to expect any relationship between wages and profitability within the 
set of firms covered by the NMFA under regulation, while between union firms and non-union 
firms we would expect the former to be less profitable unless we believed both that the 
unionization process tended to occur in more profitable firms in the industry, and that post-
unionization wage increases did not exhaust or exceed the above-average profits.  
Deregulation was an exogenous shock to the product and labor markets in for-hire trucking, a 
shock which was moderated by the differing market structures of the TL and LTL segments, and 
the differing nature of union power under the two forms of work organization implied by the two 
distinct logistical systems.  We consider the case of the LTL segment first. 
Barriers to entry in LTL grow from the need to achieve flow density over network nodes 
(section 2, above).  The nature of this sunk cost means that it is very expensive to enter with a 
big network; the only firm that tried it, Leaseway Express, started up in 1982 and failed within 
two years (Wong 2001). A less risky strategy was to extend an existing network at its 
boundaries. Almost every incumbent firm tried this strategy, as they expanded beyond the 
restricted networks bequeathed by regulation (section 2). The few successful cases of de novo 
entry began with very limited geographic scope; two noteworthy examples were Arkansas 
Freightways, and Con-Way Central Express.   
The union did not have an effective response to the changes brought by deregulation, and 
devoted almost no resources to trying to newly organize non-union firms and was ineffective 
with those it did devote (Belzer and Hurd 1999). But though union coverage in LTL declined 
steadily with the successive failure of unionized LTL firms and the more rapid growth of non-
union ones, the union was not driven out of the LTL segment (Perry 1986; Glaskowski 1990; 
Belzer 1994; Belzer 1995; Belzer 2002).   
This is because of the same organizational fact that underlies the potential equity premium 
for LTL road drivers discussed above (section 3.3.1): the role of local employees. In the 
integrated and complex logistical system used to handle LTL shipments in a terminal network 
much of the knowledge needed for cost-competitive operations resides in the tacit knowledge of 
individual employees, especially local freight handlers and local pickup and delivery drivers 
(Swan 1997; Burks 1999). This makes breaking the union prohibitively costly in LTL; to shut 
down and reopen with only those employees willing to work non-union at lower wages would  
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lose too much critical knowledge, and using a strike or lockout to remove union representation 
risks negative reciprocity from employees whose on-the-job behavior is critical to productivity 
and customer satisfaction (Fehr, Götte et al. 2009) (see, for example, the case of tire 
manufacturing (Krueger and Mas 2004)).  
In sum, due to the key organizational role of local employees in LTL, the union had 
asymmetric power: it offered no credible threat of further unionization, but it could force 
unionized firms to share the quasi-rents resulting from the sunk costs of being in the LTL 
business and having invested in the tacit knowledge of their employees.  Union firms that 
survived were likely to be those which focused on the economical use of higher cost but low 
turnover and highly experienced labor.
8 Meanwhile non-union firms grew far more rapidly—of 
the two small entrants mentioned above, one, Arkansas Freightways eventually grew to become 
the core of FedEx Freight (FedEx’s division in the LTL segment), while the second (Con-Way 
Central Express) ultimately became  Con-Way Freight, the largest LTL firm in the nation 
(Transport Topics 2011).  
In the perfectly competitive TL segment, by contrast with LTL, entry was rapid, with 
thousands of new firms, mostly small (section 2, above), and the expansion of the industry had 
an immediate and strong downward effect on freight rates (Moore 1986). The effect on TL 
unionization was even more dramatic: union coverage and driver wages dropped sharply.  Based 
on survey evidence Belzer (1994) argues that by 1991 union coverage was only 25%, less than 
half its former level, and that the implied average hourly wage in TL (union and non-union 
combined) was only 73% of that in LTL.  
The organizational reason for these declines is straightforward: TL’s simpler logistical 
system uses only road drivers. By comparison with local LTL employees, road drivers have less 
specialized tacit knowledge and less need for effectively coordinating their work effort with 
other employees, and are therefore more easily replaceable. Thus, a TL firm could close and 
restart under a new operating authority, taking none of the prior employees, or only those who 
were willing to work under the new conditions, without losing much productivity.  It was also 
                                                 
8 Thus, for instance, it is common for non-union LTL dockworkers to clean their dock area, but 
at unionized LTL firms dockworkers seldom clean; if contract cleaners (at lower wages) are 
prohibited by the local union the dock just stays dirty (Burks 1998).   
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more feasible than in LTL to break the union and operate with only those members of the 
existing work force willing to stay.  
There is substantial evidence that union TL firms behaved differently than LTL ones in the 
manner these facts suggest. While literally hundreds of incumbent unionized LTL firms failed 
after 1980, the most aggressive action most took was to ask the union to bargain wage and 
benefit concessions (Belzer 1995).  By contrast, while many of the unionized TL firms under the 
main Midwestern TL rider to the NMFA agreed to a new contract through their employer's 
association after a strike in 1979, many individual firms simply never signed the contract while 
continuing to operate, and there was little response from the union (Belzer 1994).  A TL 
exception was Schneider Transport, which was signed to a contract rider more important to the 
union because it covered mostly LTL firms; even there, after two difficult strikes, the firm won 
the right to make all expansion through its new non-union arm, Schneider National, which grew 
eventually to became second largest firm in for-hire TL (Belzer 1994; Transport Topics 2011). 
The trajectory of the union premium is contested.  Rose (1987) and Hirsch (1988), using CPS 
data, both find that the union wage premium for drivers declined following deregulation, 
although this may be confounded by a change in the CPS treatment of non-responses in 1979 
(Henrickson and Wilson 2008).  The CPS lumps all for-hire firms together, but on the basis of 
her earlier finding (Rose 1985), Rose infers the largest drop should be in LTL. Henrickson and 
Wilson(2008), using Form M data, find an increase in the premium for employees of unionized 
trucking companies following deregulation. However, they use a version of Form M with two 
significant problems: later data definitions are imposed on earlier data (see section 4.1, below); 
and the average earnings of all employees (including white collar and managerial employees) are 
used as a proxy for driver earnings; in addition, they do not use the LTL versus TL distinction 
(and had they done so it is coded in a more limited way in the later years of their panel). They 
posit a union threat effect to explain the apparent increase in the premium.  We will address both 
the Rose and Henrickson and Wilson accounts below (sections 5 and 6). 
 
3.4.  Summary of predicted effects 
Based on the discussion above we now have the following list of predicted effects for the 
potentially relevant causal factors affecting the pay of road drivers.  
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Factor  Effect on road drivers 
Compensating differentials  Higher pay in TL, both union and non-union 
Returns to cognitive skills  Higher pay in TL, both union and non-union 
Efficiency wages–assuming independent 
utilities 
Unlikely to matter, but if this factor is relevant: 
no difference in the effect on pay by segment 
Efficiency wages–perceptions of fairness with  
respect to relevant reference group  
Higher pay in LTL, both union and non-union 
Post-regulation change in union coverage  Decline of union coverage, but less rapidly in 
LTL because of quasi rents there 
Post-regulation change in union premium  Same pattern as coverage for the same reason: 
decline overall, but less rapidly in LTL 
 
4.  Data 
4.1.  The Source: the ICC’s “Form M” 
We use data from the Interstate Commerce Commission's “Form M”. Our version of this data 
set is unique providing a breakdown of employee earnings by category for this time period, thus 
allowing us to examine the influence of carrier financial performance, size, shipment-size (LTL 
versus TL) specialization, and unionization, on the pay of specific employee groups.
9 
During the years 1935-1980 the ICC required all trucking firms engaged in interstate freight 
transport (whether publicly or privately held) to file an annual report (Form M) for regulatory 
oversight purposes, and the contents of these reports were a matter of public record. Data 
originating from these forms are a unique panel data source on the operations and finances of a 
key set of firms in the trucking industry. 
The requirement to report outlived regulation, but in the absence of regulation compliance—
and hence, data quality—declined. The annual information from the paper Form M’s was 
keypunched both by the ATA, which gave the data set its most commonly used name, the 
"Motor Carrier Financial and Operating Statistics (MCF&OS),” and by the ICC.  Most scholars 
use the ATA version, which is available for more years and had better quality control over the 
keypunching process, but which omits some information. The ICC’s version of the Form M 
electronic data set, which was more complete, albeit with lower quality control, vanished when 
the agency was "sun-setted" in 1995.  But before that happened, one of us (Burks) obtained an 
extract from it which includes the breakouts of employee earnings and hours by employee 
category for 1977-1987, items which are missing from the ATA’s version until 1988.  We have 
                                                 
9 In Burks, et al. (2004) these data are used to address the effects of deregulation on the 
compensation of trucking firm executives.   
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merged this extract with the more standard version of the Form M information from the ATA, 
which includes a large subset of the other data items of interest, but which contained only the 
total number of employees and their total annual earnings.   
There are two main limitations to data originating in the Form M.  First, there was a size 
threshold below which reporting was not required (annual revenues for three successive years of 
$.5 million per year until this level was raised to $1 million in 1980), so there is no information 
on small incumbents, and also none on most of the new post-regulation entrants in TL, who 
generally were too small to meet the reporting requirement initially.  Second, the ICC relied on 
voluntary compliance; once the economic regulations that made it in the interest of firms to 
report were lifted, this became less effective.  Many of the new TL entrants either did not know 
of the reporting threshold, or simply ignored it, when they became large enough to cross it.  In 
addition, a few (mostly TL) incumbents that had been reporting began to withdraw from doing so 
towards the end of the 1980’s.   
As a result, up to the dawn of deregulation, the data set gives an excellent picture of the 
entire population of medium and large-sized incumbents. It also provides a good picture of the 
attrition and transformation of those incumbents under the impact of deregulation, especially in 
the earlier years of the process. However, it tells us very little about the new firms that entered 
the industry at small scale (although it does capture some that entered at larger scale).  And its 
reliability as a picture of the overall population of medium and large firms slowly decreases with 
time.
10 
We use the years 1977 through 1986. This is a period in which the reporting form and the 
data definitions were kept constant and reporting compliance remained high (thus avoiding the 
problems faced by Henrickson and Wilson (2008)), and also allows us to compare our results 
with those of Hirsch (1988) and Rose (1987), who study the earnings of drivers in this same 
period using CPS data. We stop in 1986 rather than 1987 (the year before the first large reduction 
in the reporting format and corresponding change in variable definitions) because the latter year 
saw a sharp decrease in the number of firms for which the ICC entered the employee earnings 
information; a similar omission occurs in the 1981 data, but we correct for this problem by 
interpolating between 1980 and 1982 for those firms that appear in both years.   
                                                 
10 In addition, the reporting requirements were downsized, changing the definitions of important 
variables in 1988 (and then again in 1994 and 1999), limiting accurate comparisons over time.  
 
Page 18 of 37 
 
The quality control limitations on all the electronic data from the Form M, but especially 
keypunch and processing omissions and errors in the ICC’s version, make extensive data 
cleaning efforts (such as the interpolation just mentioned) necessary before the data can be 
considered reliable.  Fortunately, some systematic redundancies in the variable definitions 
(which are greatest in the version collected through 1987), plus the panel nature of the data set, 
make it possible to correct many, perhaps even most, of the errors.   
 
4.2.  Observations and Variables Used 
The entire data set contains observations on firms of many types, including local and special 
commodity haulers.  We restrict our attention to those meeting the definition of the ICC’s 
“Instruction 27,” which applies to firms obtaining at least 75% of their revenues from the 
intercity common carriage of general commodities (CFR 1992).  We use this subset because we 
are interested in long distance freight transport, and in firms that use general purpose equipment 
and therefore compete directly with each other.   
Under economic regulation common carriers were required to publish their rates through rate 
bureaus, and to offer their services at those rates to all customers; firms in the contrasting 
category, contract carriers, were permitted to have individualized and confidential contracts with 
shippers, but were limited to eight customers in total, and no firm could offer both types of 
pricing and service.  Deregulation abolished the limitation on the total number of contract 
customers for contract carriers. Also, all firms could easily obtain both types of authority, and 
nearly all did so: thus, many of the “new” entrants in the Instruction 27 dataset after 1980 are 
actually contract carriers that acquired common carrier authority and began to compete more 
widely for customers. Thus, the Instruction 27 subset captures the relevant set of firms—those 
that competed with each other to serve the general shipping public—across the 
regulation/deregulation divide. 
The 1977-1986 Form M (in our version, which includes the break out of earnings by 
employee category) uses two categories for employee drivers, line-haul (over-the-road) drivers 
that are paid on a mileage basis, and employee drivers who are paid on some other basis. The 
latter heading lumps together two disparate categories: the larger of these consists of local, or 
city pickup-and-delivery, drivers, who are generally paid by the hour; the smaller consists of 
road drivers who are paid a percentage of the revenue generated by each load they transport.  
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Since we do not know the mix of these two types, either overall or for any particular observation, 
we focus our study on mileage-paid line-haul drivers. 
Form M requires the firm to report the number of line-haul drivers employed, and the total 
compensation paid to line-haul drivers in the year. We divide total compensation by number 
employed to obtain average annual road driver earnings. For estimation purposes, we use natural 
log of the real (1982-84) dollars (EARNINGS). 
Among the Instruction 27 carriers, some do not employ mileage-paid road drivers (those 
which do not generally rely on owner-operators for truckload haulage). Restricting our sample to 
firms which do, and deleting observations with obvious data problems, we have 2,191 
observations on 462 firms, an average of 4.7 per firm, from 1977 to 1986.  
Form M does not tell us whether or not a firm’s drivers are represented by a union; in the 
vintage used here it does, however, tell us the proportion of total firm expenses for employee 
health care and retirement that goes to union-affiliated health and welfare funds. Since most 
firms in the industry are essentially either union or non-union where drivers are concerned and 
drivers make up a large share of their workforce, this measure is bi-modally distributed. For 
estimation purposes, we create a binary variable, UNION, where UNION = 1 when the union-
affiliated fund proportion is greater than 0.35. This cut-off may seem low, but Belzer’s (1995) 
survey finds that within the small number of partially-union trucking firms, non-union and union 
drivers wages differ little – a fact that he attributes to a union threat effect within such firms 
(distinct from a threat across firms, discussed in section 3.3.2). While the precise level of any 
cut-off is arbitrary, we believe that for this reason a relatively low cutoff is reasonable. 
With the 0.35 cut-off, 435 of the 462 firms in our sample keep the same union status for all 
observations in our dataset. This poses a practical problem for panel estimation, because UNION 
is nominally time-varying but only superficially so: a fixed effects estimate of a union wage 
effect, for instance, would rest entirely on the internal (“within”) variation in 27 of the 462 firms. 
We also doubt that these 27 give an accurate or representative measure of firms that switched in 
union status (meaning, in practice, from union to non-union): at least some other firms made this 
switch by shutting down, and then re-opening with the same ownership but a new name and new 
ICC registration number, but any such cases in our data set are recorded as two separate firms. 
To resolve both of these concerns, we treat each firm that switches between union and non-union 
as two different firms for estimation purposes.  
 
Page 20 of 37 
 
Form M treats any shipment of over 10,000 lbs. as “truckload” and anything below that as 
“less than truckload.” The exact location of the division is to some degree arbitrary, especially as 
the maximum cargo weight for a full truckload shipment approximately doubled between the 
1930’s, when this number was selected, and the period studied here. However, as long as the 
division is made consistently, and at a level above the average weight of an LTL shipment at 
firms that are highly LTL-specialized (which is about 1,000 lbs. in our data), it is a useful 
measure.  The variable LTLShare is the proportion of the firm's total operating revenue which is 
generated by LTL shipments; the balance is due to TL shipments.  
Our measure of firm size is the natural log of real total operating revenue (REVENUE). The 
Form M data includes balance sheet information from which it would in principle be possible to 
construct a measure of current return on either equity or on total capital employed. However, a 
large percentage of our firms are privately and closely held, and case study work on the industry 
suggests that tax considerations, unchecked by the public reporting requirements for stock 
exchange listing, affect the asset values reported to the ICC by firms of this type (Burks 1998). 
As a measure of financial performance (and, implicitly, of product market rents) we use the ratio 
of operating profit (before interest payments and income taxes) to total operating revenues, 
labeled MARGIN in the models below.  
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used. These are decomposed into within-
firm and between-firm elements. 
###Table 1 about here### 
The number of firms in the sample, and the number of road drivers employed by these firms, 
both decline over time. This is not surprising considering the combination of the entry of small 
truckload firms falling below the ICC’s reporting threshold, reduced compliance with the 
reporting requirement, and increased productivity in the deregulated, de-unionizing market. 
Considering the discussion in section 3.3.2, note in particular the decline in unionized firms; 
union decline occurs both the TL and the LTL segment, but in the TL segment it leaves very few 
unionized firms by the mid -1980s (Figure 2). 
###Figure 2 about here### 
 
5.  The empirical model, and estimation results 
The model we wish to estimate takes the general form:  
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(1) DRIVERi,t =  f(LTLSHAREi,t, LTLSHARE
2
i,t, UNIONi, REVENUEi,t, MARGINi,t, YEAR DUMMIES, 
INTERACTION TERMS, αi + εi,t) 
We have unbalanced panel data, with panels ranging from one to ten observations and a 
mean of 4.7 observations. The longer panels (8-10 years) account for a little over half of the 
observations; these are firms that tend to be larger, and which are predominantly LTL specialists; 
the firms in the short-panel population are smaller on average, and are more heterogeneous 
(Table 2). We could get something close to a balanced panel by restricting our sample to the 
firms with 8-10 years of observations only, but this would come at the cost of restricting 
ourselves to an unrepresentative sub-sample with relatively little variation in LTLSHARE, one of 
the principal variables of interest. 
###Table 2 about here### 
We cannot use a fixed effects estimator because one of our variables of interest (UNION) is 
time-invariant; even if this were not an obstacle, the number of very short panels would 
exacerbate that estimator’s problems of inefficiency and errors-in-variables bias (Hausman and 
Taylor 1981). Use of a random effects estimator, however, raises the question of correlation 
between the individual effects and the group means. The standard Hausman test for this problem 
would require fixed effects estimates, which we don’t have; even if we did, the test is not valid 
with time dummies in the model (Imbens and Wooldridge 2007).  
Following Imbens and Wooldridge, we use instead an approach based on Mundlak (1978): 
we first add to the model the group (i.e., firm) means for each time-varying variable, and obtain 
GLS (random effects) estimates. Including the firm mean for a variable takes out the “between” 
effect, so that the coefficients on the individual variables are the same as those produced using 
the within, or fixed-effects, estimator. The test for then using the GLS estimator without some or 
all of the group means is then simply a chi-square test of the restriction that the coefficients are 
jointly zero on those group means that would be excluded. The inclusion or exclusion of group 
means is not an all-or-nothing choice: just as we retain the time-invariant UNION, we may choose 
to retain one or more group means if our tests reject the null hypothesis that they are uncorrelated 
with the individual effect.  
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Model 1, is the most general, containing interaction terms of LTLSHARE and its square with 
UNION, and with a dummy for REGULATED (1977-1978) versus deregulated (1979-1986)
11; firm 
means are also included for all variables. The restriction that all of the coefficients on the group 
means are zero is not rejected (Table 4). We see no significant effect of MARGIN on earnings in 
Model 1, whether in the within- or the between effect. The absence of any statistically significant 
effect continues when we drop either the individual observations or the group means for MARGIN 
(Table 4). (Similarly, there is no statistically significant effect of margin within subgroups 
defined by interactions with UNION, LTLSHARE, and REGULATED; details are not reported here, 
but are in an appendix available from the authors.) The coefficient on REVENUE is a firm size 
effect, and as expected is positive. 
#### Table 3 about here #### 
#### Table 4 about here #### 
Model 2 reports estimates with the group means removed. It still includes a full set of 
interactions between LTLSHARE, UNION, and REGULATED, allowing us to get separate estimates 
for the effect of LTLSHARE (in quadratic form) on earnings in four different regimes (union-
regulated, non-union- regulated, union-de-regulated, non-union-de-regulated). The only 
statistically significant coefficients are for the first of these four cases (regulated union). A zero 
restriction on the interactions which distinguish between the other three categories is not 
rejected; if we go back to Model 1, and combine these new restrictions with the previous 
restrictions that got us from Model 1 to Model 2, we still fail to reject this larger set of 
restrictions. Incorporating the new restrictions, we obtain Model 3. 
Figure 3 shows the marginal effect, from Model 3, of LTLSHARE on earnings for the union-
regulated case, and for the other three cases (called here the general case). We see no statistically 
significant effect of LTLSHARE on earnings for union drivers under regulation, while in the 
general case the marginal effect of increased LTLSHARE is positive until LTLSHARE reaches 0.8, 
                                                 
11 Consistent with most of the literature, we treat 1978 as the last year of regulation. It is not 
obvious that this is the correct approach: the onset of de-regulation was much discussed, and thus 
presumably had some effect on markets in previous years; it was not in fact a single event; and, 
after it had occurred, it may have taken some time for its effects on union power, employment 
relationships, market structure and the organization of production to work themselves out. We 
tested this by replacing REGULATED with year dummies in the key interactions, and find that 
there is indeed a step change in the union premium between 1978 and 1979. Details are in an 
appendix available from the authors. 
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which is roughly the 75
th percentile of the LTLSHARE distribution in the data. Beyond this the 
point estimate of the effect is negative, but small in size and statistically insignificant. Figure 4 
shows the fitted earnings estimates, for road drivers, union and non-union, as functions of 
LTLSHARE, for the years 1978 and 1984; 1978, of course, is regulated, and 1984 is de-regulated; 
the REVENUE variables are held at their sample means. The vertical distance between the curves 
in each panel represents the union premium. From Figure 4, we can see that the fall in the 
premium following deregulation (the positive coefficient on UNION*REGULATED in Model 3) is 
due largely to a deterioration of the relative position of unionized drivers in truckload firms. 
#### Figure 3 about here #### 
#### Figure 4 about here #### 
Model 4 estimates of the effect of UNION on driver’s earnings, without LTLSHARE, to ask a 
question that parallels that of Henrickson and Wilson (2008) with our model, but focusing on 
road driver earninings. We interact the UNION dummy with one for REGULATED (1977-1978; 
REGULATED does not appear on its own, as it is colinear with the year dummies). The coefficient 
on UNION*REGULATED is negative: that is, if we omit LTLSHARE, the estimated union premium 
rises following degregulation, consistent with the finding of Henrickson and Wilson. Omiting 
LTLSHARE has this effect because, following deregulation, the lower-paid TL segment becomes 
predominantly non-union, while the union holds on, despite a declining share, in LTL.  
Figure 5 shows the difference in the union premium, across the range of values of LTLSHARE, 
between 1978 and 1984: the union premium does fall sharply in TL companies, but holds up in 
LTL companies. 
###Figure 5 about here### 
 
6.  Discussion and conclusion 
Using data disaggregated by employee group that was not available to prior researchers, we 
find that—except in unionized companies under regulation—road drivers are paid more in 
companies with higher proportions of their business in LTL: this holds for union drivers post-
regulation, and for non-union drivers both in both regulated and de-regulated settings. We 
therefore take an LTL earnings premium to be the prevaling circumstance in competitive labor 
and product markets; the lack of such a premium for unionized drivers under regulation is  
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attributable to the IBT’s ability, through the NMFA, to enforce industry-wide near-uniformity in 
the earnings of unionized road drivers across the LTL and TL segments. 
Unionized road drivers are also paid a premium throughout the period studied, and our 
disaggretated data also allow a new look at this fact. Under regulation, this premium was greater 
for TL road drivers, but that is just another way of saying that the NMFA did not differentiate 
between road drivers in TL and LTL. After de-regulation, the union premium for TL and LTL 
road drivers become comparable; in both TL and LTL, the union share of employment shrinks, 
but it shrinks far more rapidly in TL. As shown by the test in Section 5, the post-regulation rise 
in the union premium found by Henrickson and Wilson is spurious, due to an un-modelled 
composition effect: the rapid de-unionization of the lower-paid TL firms (where the union 
premium actually declined), and the continued union presence in the relatively well-paid LTL 
firms. 
The lower road driver earnings in TL come despite what appear to be greater cognitive 
demands of work in that segment of the industry, and also despite working conditions which 
should, if anything, bring forth higher compensating differentials. Road driving in both TL and 
LTL segments is easily monitored, for which reason we rule out standard efficiency wage 
arguments in both segments (in the TL segment, the extremely high turnover also rules this out). 
In both segments, drivers’ earnings are independent of the firm’s operating margins in 
comparable firms, whether measured by the firm’s mean performance or its deviation from that 
performance, and—given the argument of Section 3.3.2 that after deregulation any sharing 
would be firm-specific—we rule out sharing of product market rents.  
The LTL premium is consistent with an equity premium for road drivers employed by firms 
which also employ a large number of local P&D drivers, and in which the form of work 
organization occasions more regular interaction with other employees. It is because this premium 
grows out of the production technology, not regulatory rents, that Rose’s prediction (1987), that 
LTL drivers would lose more than TL drivers after deregulation, is not borne out. 
The continuing union premium across both segments, together with declining union coverage 
and the especially rapid decline in TL,taken together suggest that the post-regulation union 
premium results from the sharing of quasi rents. Unionized firms have three choices: share rents 
in this way, break the union, or exit. Breaking the union is costly, and where there are significant  
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quasi-rents (that is, in the LTL segment, as argued in Section 3.3.2) a threat to exit is not 
credible.  
To summarize the theme behind our new findings, if we ask why road drivers in LTL firms 
have much higher earnings than road drivers in TL firms in this time period, internal equity 
concerns that affect all LTL firms, together with the greater ability of unions to remain in place 
due to sunk costs that affects the union premium, are the explanations that are consistent with the 
data. Both explanations are grounded in a differences in the production technology and 
consequently in the organization of work, rather than in job demands, worker quality, or 
monitoring.   
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
Variable   Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
      
EARNINGS  overall 10.3552 .3793903  6.82613 12.87019 
  between   .4265173  6.82613 11.92747 
  within    .2110324 8.292353 12.42493 
       
UNION  overall  .6947417 .4606239 0  1 
  between   .4740619  0  1 
  within   0  .6947417  .6947417 
       
LTL  overall  .6530014 .2235427 0  1 
  between   .257025 0  1 
  within    .0705816 .1788917 1.491797 
       
LTL^2  overall .4763589  .229107 0  1 
  between   .2417048  0  1 
  within   .0837756  -.0063347  1.328056 
       
MARGIN  overall  .0226844 .0633947 -.2227717  .2585545 
  between   .0561116  -.2227717  .2471036 
  within   .0373664  -.2048793  .166136 
       
REVENUE  overall  16.75224 1.490796 13.13445 21.17368 
 between   1.432638  13.64636  20.97844 
 within   .2201567  14.68326  17.88252 
 
N =    2149 
n =     480 
T-bar = 4.48 
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Table 2 
Table 2a: distribution of panel lengths 
 
length |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          1 |         94        4.37        4.37 
          2 |        134        6.24       10.61 
          3 |        120        5.58       16.19 
          4 |        196        9.12       25.31 
          5 |        180        8.38       33.69 
          6 |        114        5.30       38.99 
          7 |        161        7.49       46.49 
          8 |        256       11.91       58.40 
          9 |        414       19.26       77.66 
         10 |        480       22.34      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      2,149      100.00 
 
 
Table 2b: LTLSHARE in long (t>=8) and short (t<8) panels 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.     Min        Max 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
long      |      1150    .7087176    .1845431       0   .9870326 
 
short      |       999    .5808128    .2508189       0          1 
 
   
 




  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 Model 4
        
UNION 0.220
* 0.087  0.190
*** 0.233
***





 (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.09)  (0.03) 
LTL -0.125  0.346  0.755
**  
 (0.65)  (0.33)  (0.28)   
LTL^2 0.179  -0.104  -0.518   
 (0.54)  (0.34)  (0.30)   
REG*LTL 1.215
* 0.958
*    
 (0.50)  (0.45)     
REG*LTL^2 -1.239
* -0.885     
 (0.50)  (0.46)     
UNION*LTL 1.204  0.627     
 (0.85)  (0.53)     
UNION*LTL^2 -0.960  -0.614     
 (0.77)  (0.54)     
UNION*REG*LTL -1.766
** -1.649
** -0.592  
 (0.60)  (0.56)  (0.33)   
UNION*REG*LTL^2 1.609
** 1.345
* 0.374   
 (0.60)  (0.56)  (0.32)   
MARGIN -0.207       






 (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
Firm means (“between” effects) 
REVENUE XBAR  -0.087       
 (0.05)       
MARGIN XBAR  0.582       
 (0.37)       
LTL XBAR  1.000       
 (0.82)       
LTL^2 XBAR  -0.869       
 (0.79)       
UNION*LTL XBAR  -1.461       
 (1.08)       
UNION*LTL^2 XBAR  1.190       
 (1.07)       
REG*LTL XBAR  -2.422       
 (1.76)       
REG*LTL^2 XBAR  3.296       
 (2.26)       
UNION*REG*LTL XBAR  2.938       
 (1.80)       
UNION*REG*LTL^2 XBAR  -3.788       
 (2.30)       
 
Table 3 continued on next page 
   
 




        
Table 3 (continued) 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 
        
Year dummies (1977 omitted) 
1978 0.014  0.016  0.016  0.015 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
1979 0.098  0.107  -0.091
** -0.097
** 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
1980 0.095  0.100  -0.099
** -0.106
** 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
1981 0.102  0.107  -0.093
** -0.099
***
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
1982 0.068  0.069  -0.131
*** -0.135
***
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
1983 0.029  0.027  -0.175
*** -0.181
***
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
1984 0.023  0.030  -0.171
*** -0.179
***
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
1985 -0.005  0.009  -0.191
*** -0.206
***
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
1986 -0.014  0.004  -0.196
*** -0.216
***






 (0.22)  (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.25) 





Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 4: Tests of restrictions on regression models 1 and 2 
  Model 1  Model 2 
LTL XBAR = 0 
LTL^2 XBAR = 0 
UNION*LTL XBAR = 0 
UNION*LTL^2 XBAR = 0 
REG*LTL XBAR = 0 
REG*LTL^2 XBAR = 0 
UNION*REG*LTL XBAR = 0 
UNION*REG*LTL^2 XBAR = 0 
MARGIN XBAR = 0  
REVENUE XBAR = 0 
chi2( 10) = 11.81 
Prob> chi2 = 0.2978 
 
Adding this restrictions 
to those above: 
MARGIN = 0  
 
chi2( 11) = 12.64 
Prob> chi2 = 0.3173 
 
Model 2 incorporates all 
restrictions. Testing 
these further 
restrictions on Model 2: 
UNION*LTL = 0 
UNION*LTL^2 = 0 
REG*LTL = 0 
REG*LTL^2 = 0 
  chi2(  4) = 4.99 
Prob> chi2 = 0.2887 
 
Going back to Model 1, 
and testing all of the 
restrictions together: 
chi2( 15) = 17.69 
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For this graph, LTL is defined as having over 40%
of tonnage shipped in loads above the LTL threshold.
Figure 2
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Figure 3
Marginal effect of LTL share on driver earnings,
with 95% confidence interval 
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